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Laura A. Heymann *

Inducement as Contributory Copyright Infringement:

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd. *·~

I. Introduction
Until fairly recently, the mass distribution of sound and video recordings has
proceeded unimpeded by parallel developments in the ability to make inexpensive (a nd unauthorized) copies of that content. Before the digital age,
copying (such as the use of a cassette recorder to make copies of music
played over the radio) posed little threat to the market for such recordings
because those copies were highly imperfect, took considerable time to create,
133 Report on Responses to the Europea n Co mmi ssio n Green Paper on Counterfe itin g and
Piracy, 7 June 1999, <http://europa.eu.inr/comm/interna l_marketlen/indprop/piracy/
pi racyen . pdf>.
• Assistant Professor of Law at the Coll ege of William & Mary's Marshall-Wyth e School
of Law in Williamsburg, Virginia .
The author would like to thank Susan P. Crawford for her helpful comments.
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and were difficult to distribute widely without great effort. As a resul t, such
copying was, at least implicitly, treated as fair use and in many cases shoul d
have been seen as unobjectionable in any event. With the preva lence of
media in digital form, and the adoption of broadband technologies that
enable communications over the internet in fractions of a second, the impact
on di stribution from copying has ceased to be a latent concern. Because
copies of digital content are virtually indistinguishable from the original, a nd
distribution can take place both broadly and quickly, conten t owners now
have a more robust- although as yet unproven- clai m that such distribution
will harm traditional markets and distribution models for creative content
and therefore ca nnot be seen as fair use. 1
Even where copying is unlawful , however, that should not necessarily mean
that the distributors of the technology used to engage in such copying shoul d
also be liable for infringement. When a copy of protected con tent is made,
some device, software, or other product must be used in the endeavor,
whether a cassette recorder, a video tape recorder, or softwa re that enables
digital copies. Despite the fact that the e technologies are genera ll y agnostic
as to th e particular nature of their use, content owner have pursued not
only wrongful end users for their infringing activities but also the intermediaries who, content owners claim, contribute to and profit fro m end user
infringement by distributing such technologies. Chief among these efforts
was litigation brought by the Recording lndu try Association of America
(RJAA) and others against Napster, a service that ena bled end users to locate
files and download them from other users across the internet. In a suit that
culminated in an appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Napster was found to be subject to both contributory and vicarious
liability for its users' copyright infringement, resulting primarily from the
structure of the Napster system, which routed all sea rch queries through a
central server maintained a nd controlled by Napster. 2 It was this centralization that led the appeals court to conclude that Napster knowingly contributed to infringement a nd financially benefited from an acti vity within irs
control. 3 As a result, apster was required, in response to notice from the
content owners, to remove access to infringing content listed on its servers or
face lia bility, a task tha t ultimately ended the service as it then existed. 4
The next generation of internet file exchange networks differs in one significa nt respect from Napster. Rather tha n relying on a central search index
stored on a server controlled by a single entity, the software creating these
networks facilitates sea rches a mong the computers participating in the network at a particular time, distributing search request along the transient
network until the requested file is fo und, then enablin g a direct link between
l Indeed, it may we ll be rhe case th a t such distribution c rea tes new markets for content by
introducing consumers ro conrenr with which they were previously unfamilia r.
2 A& M Records, Inc. v. Naps ter, l1tC., 239 F.Jd 1004 (9th Cir. 2001 ).
3 I d. a t l 022, I 024.
4 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 E3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002).
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the requesting computer a nd the source computer to transmit the file. (These
types of network s are typically referred to as " peer-to-peer" (or "P2P")
networks because the exc ha nge takes place directly between two computers
at the sa me organizational level of the network, functioning as both clients
and serve rs ("peers").)
From a user's perspective, a peer-to-peer network yields potentiall y quicker
searches an d access to a wider array of sources than are available through a
apster-type service (albeit with the concomitant risk of decreased quality
control). Because distribution over a peer-to-peer network does not rely on
each search request's passing through a central computer server, there is less
of a risk of the network's fai ling entirely when one computer fails .5 From the
content provider's perspective, however, such networks are moving litigation
targets because no one entity controls the flow of traffic over the network.
The more stable targets, in the content providers' view, are the distributors
of the softwa re that ena bled the networks to fo rm, even though the software
itself is not des igned to di stribute any panicular type of file . The question for
the courts in the case brought against some of those distributors, MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 6 was whether th e distributors
maintained a sufficient level of involvement with the infringing activity that
took place using their software post-distribution to be deemed liable for that
infringement _? The case was ultimately heard by the U.S. Supreme Court,
whic h iss ued its opinion in June 2005. 8 As with the lower courts before it,
the Co urt's cha llenge was to provide an answer to this question that re mained faithful to the central goal of copyright law: providing copyright
protection suffici ent to encourage production of creative works without
sti fling the development of tec hnology.

II. Contributory Copyright Infringement
U.S. copyright laws give the a uthor of a work a number of exclusive rights;
th ose rights allow the copyright owner to exploit the work in certain ways
for a limited time per iod and to bring suit against those who violate those
rights. 9 But it has long been the case that it is not solely the direct infringer
5 Metro-Go ldwyn-Ma}'er Studios In c. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Cr. 2764, 2770 (2005 ); see
this issue of IIC at 124. Of course, it is the very lack of centra lization tha t leads to a lack
of control over netwo rk reso urces. /d. n.l .
6 Metro -Goldwyn-Mayer Studios In c. v. Groks ter, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (C. D.
Cal. 2001), a{('d, 380 !'.3d 1154 (9th Ci r. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Cr. 2764 (2005).
7 Alr ho ugh the con ten t owners so ught to hold the softwa re distributors liable both o n a
theory of cont ributory copyright infringe ment and on a t heory of vicarious copyright infringe ment, the U.S. Supreme Cou rt's decision foc used on ly o n contributory infringement.
Groks ter, 125 S. Ct. at 2776.
8 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
9 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102 (su bject matter of copyright); id. § I 06 (exclusive rights of copy right
owner); id. § 302 (duration of copy right for works created on o r after January 1, 1978); id.
§ SO I (infr ingement of copy right ). But see 17 U.S. C. § 107 (fair use limitations o n exclusive
rights ).
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who is liable for copyright infringement. As in the common law, those who
knowingly contribute to another's copyright infringement can also be held
liable for the underlying acts.
The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement was articulated in
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc. , 10 in
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set forth a now often
cited statement defining when one party can be held liable for contributing
to the copyright infringement of another: when the defendant "induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct'' with "knowledge
of the infringing activity." 11 Such conduct generally takes two forms: either
personal conduct that furthers the infringement or contribution of the means
of infringement. 12 In Gershwin, an artist management agency was held to be
contributorily liable for infringement caused by the unauthorized performance of copyrighted songs in community concerts it was largely responsible
for organizing. Although the agency knew which songs would be performed
in advance of the concerts, it made no effort to obtain copyright clearance. JJ
Similarly, in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 14 the owners of a swap
meet were held liable for the infringing records sold at many of its booths
where the owners had been informed of the infringing activity and continued
to provide the support services that allowed the swap meet to operate. 15
These cases did not answer the question of whether the provider of a product
or service that contributed to copyright infringement in some, but not
substantially all, instances (or only in connection with some uses) would also
be subject to liability. The U.S. Supreme Court gave at least a partial answer
to this question in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios. 16 Sony
involved a contributory copyright infringement suit brought by the owners
of the copyright in certain television programs against the manufacturer of
video tape recorders . Purchasers of these recorders were engaged in both
infringing uses (taping programs to create a personal "library" for home use)
and noninfringing uses ("time-shifting" programs by taping them to watch
later). Given that the majority concluded that Sony did not actively encourage buyers to engage in copyright infringement by, for example, including
recommendations to that effect in its advertising or in its instruction manual
(although the dissenting justices took some issue with this conclusion 17 ), the
question before the Court was whether the mere sale of video tape recorders
to the general public was a knowing, material contribution to copyright
infringement that could give rise to liability. Sony knew, the Court con10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
ld. at 1162 (footnote omirted) .
See, e.g. , 3-12 '"t immer on copyright," § 12.04 (2005).
Gershwin, 443 F.2d ar 1163.
76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
/d. at 264.
464 u.s. 417 (1984).
/d. at 459 (Biackmun,]., dissenting) .
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eluded, that some of its customers were using its recorders to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material, even though not all of the uses
constituted copyright infringement and even though it did not have actual
knowledge of which consumers were engaged in lawful uses and which were
not.
The Court recognized that if it deemed Sony to have the requisite level of
knowledge for liability based simply on constructive knowledge - in other
words, based on the fact that Sony could assume some of its customers were
using the recorder to make copies of protected material - the sale of any
technology that had both legal and illegal uses would be highly restricted.
The photocopier, the camera, and the computer, to take three examples,
would fail under such a standard. As the Court put it, when "a charge of
contributory infringement is predicated entirely on the sale of an article of
commerce that is used by the purchaser to infringe ... , the public interest in
access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated." 18 If Sony had
been liable for the mere act of distributing video tape recorders because
some customers used them tO engage in in&ingement, distribution would
almost certainly have ceased entirely, thus ending even lawful uses outside
the scope of the exclusive rights of the content owners. Thus, the Court held
that ''the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of
commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is ...
capable of substantial noninfringing uses" (or, as the Court also put it,
"commercially significant noninfringing uses"). 19 The sale of video tape
recorders could continue unimpeded by copyright law. 20
Under the Sony standard, the "material contribution plus knowledge of the
in fringing activity" basis of contributory liability cannot be sa tisfied by the
mere sale or di stribution of a product or technology used by some customers
for infringeme nt with the constructive knowledge that infringing activity is
taking place. The standard embodies two important limitations on liability.
First, it recognizes the difference between knowledge acquired before the
product is distributed and knowledge acquired afterward. The theory behind
this standard is that if the product has only infringing uses (or trivial
noninfringing ones), then the defendant can be charged with knowledge of
the later uses to which its customers will put the product - because all of
them are infringing, the defendant knows at the time he distributes the
product that he is contributing to copyright infringement. But if the product
is capable of su bstantial non infringing uses, then the defendant cannot be
18 Td. at 440.
19 Id. at 442. The standard was based on the ''stapl e article of commerce" theo ry from
patent law, pursuant to wh ich the sa le of a "staple a rticle or com modity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use" is nor con tributory patent infringement. See id.
at 440; 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
20 Indeed, the conven tio nal wisdom holds that this was a beneficia l loss for the movie-studio
plaintiffs, who then were able to take adva nt age of the marker for video tape rentals rhar
later deve loped.

36

Heymann

II

Vol. 7

charged w ith constructive knowledge of the subseq uent uses. Even if the
defendant knows that some customers will engage in such uses post-sa le, it
cannot easi ly change its activity at the time of the sa le to ferret out th ose
uses. And even if the defendant were later to receive info rma ti o n tha t wou ld
enable it easi ly to distingui sh infringing from noninfringing uses, the information would be ineffective beca use there wo uld be nothing at that point
that the defe nd a nt could do- the item ha ving a lrea dy been sol d, the defenda nt cannot retract its contribution to the infringement. ln short, the Sony
sta ndard recognizes tha t when the contributio n a nd th e kn ow ledge occ ur at
different tim es, li a bility is unwarranted.
The second limitation implied in the Sony sta nda rd is shown by the Co urt's
emphasis on the uses that are poss ibl e given the product's d es ign (i. e., "capable of substantial noninfringing uses"), rather than the uses that th e plaintiff
claims currently exist. In other words, even if most users curre ntl y are using
a particular technology for infringin g uses, there may be other, noninfringing
uses for the technology in the future that warrant a finding of no lia bil ity
today. Thus, in the Sony case, the Court found that eve n though the amo unt
of noninfringing use of video tape recorders may have been as low as
9 percent at the time of th e litigation, 21 that amount demonstrated the
product's abi lity to be used la wfull y. This second limitation a ll ows beneficial
technology to develop unhindered by the nature of its in i rial uses, th ereby
freeing inventors from th e fear th a t their lega l fortun es rise or fall wi th the
intent of early a dopters. Notab ly, the Sony Court did not involve itse lf in the
technology's design . It did not, for exa mple, consi der whether th e video tape
recorder could have eliminated or modified its recording capabili ti es in o rder
to reduce the amount of infringing uses . Rather, it assessed the capabi lity o f
the des ign as it then ex isted in the market.
Taken together, these two limitations serve to a ll ow new technology the
breathing room necessa ry for development . The standard condition s li abi lity
on the developer's knowing provision of technology designed for infringem ent, not the provision of technology designed for copying . The video tape
record er, the cassette recorder, th e photocopier, a nd the comp uter a ll easily
survive such a standard, as they should.
The Sony standard was at the core of the 2001 case of A& M Records , In c. v.
Napster, /nc.22 Napster provided a service by which users cou ld trade electroni c fil es over the internet. Users registered with the service and uploaded
to Napster's se rvers the titles of the files t he y would ma ke avai lable to share
(but not the files themselves). N apster maintained these file titles in a central
index; when an end user wanted to locate music, he would use Napster's

21 See Metro-Go ldwyn.-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Cc 2764, 2788 (2005)
(Breyer, ]. , concu rring) . The lawful uses consisted of private, noncommerci a l time-shifting
in the home (taping programs to view late r), which was auth orized by some copyright
holders and constitu ted fair use in any event.
22 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001 ).
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oftware to search a ubset of this central index representing the files available from users currently online. If he found a ma tch, Napster's servers
would send the IP address of the user with the desired file; a direct lP
connection between the two users would transmit a copy of the file from one
to the other ("peer-to-peer file sharing") . Because the index was the only way
to locate files, and because the index was maintained on Napster's servers,
apster was an integral part of the file transfers. If Napster shut down, the
ability to locate files, and thus the ability to transfer them electronically,
would go with it. 23
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found not only that Napster
met the material contribution part of the analysis but also that it satisfied the
knowledge requirement. 24 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized that it was clearl y distinguishing "the architecture of the Napster
system," which by itself could not provide a basis for liability, from "Napster's conduct in relation to the operational capacity of the system." 25 Thus,
following Sony, the Ninth Circuit held that Napster did not have the requi site level of knowledge merely from the constructive knowledge that "peer-to
peer file sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights," 26
given that the technology was capable of substantial noninfringing uses
(trading noncopyrighted documents, or documents where trading is authorized, such as the use of the technology among various offices in a company).
However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that apster had actual knowledge of
the infringing conduct as a result of notices from the RIAA of infringing
materi al being traded using the Napster search index, 27 and that Napster's
continued pa rticipation in that infringement - in other words, its failure to
remove those song titl es from th e index- was a knowing, material contribution to any future acts of infringement. 28 In each such case, therefore,
N apster wa s (in the court's vi ew) knowingly providing technology for the
purpose of infringement.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took a different approach
to the constructive knowledge issue in a case ca lled In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation. 29 Rather than simply concluding that the service at issue (a filetrading service that piggybacked on a popular instant messaging service) had
substantial noninfringing uses, the court conducted a cost-benefit analysis
that aimed to determine an "estimate of the respective magnitudes of these
uses. " 30 It is not enough, the Seventh Circuit concluded, that the system at
issue be theoretically capable of noninfringing uses, since only a failure of

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

/d. at 10 11 - 12.
/d. at 1020-22.
/d. at 1020.
/d. at 1020-21.
/d. at 1020 and n.5.
Jd. at 1022.
334 F.3d 643 (7th Ci r. 2003) (Posner, j .), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
/d. at 649.
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post-hoc litigation creativity would defeat the operator of such a system.
Rather, the court noted, the focus should be on whether those uses are both
likely and cost-justified; in other words, " if the infringing use are sub tanrial, then to avoid liability as a contributory infringer the provider of the
service must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for him
to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing uses." 31 The
Seventh Circuit thus indicated a willingness to become involved in technology design that was absent from both the Sony and the Napster decisions.

It was against this backdrop of cases that the U.S. Supreme Court considered
the technology at issue in Grokster.

III. Background of the Case
Grokster began when a number of motion picture studios, recording com panies, songwriters, and music publishers (referred to collectively here with the
name of the lead plaintiff, Metro-Goldwyn -Mayer Studios In c. (MGM)),
brought suit again t three defendants: StreamCast Networks, Inc., Grokster,
Ltd., and Kazaa BY. All three defendants, at the time the complaint was
filed, distributed peer-to-peer software free of charge via download to end
users. 32 The software, once launched from the end user's computer, connected to other online users employing the same technology and enabled the
end user to share certain designated files on his computer with those other
users, creating, in effect, a network of users. 33 Although many of the files
shared were likely to be music files, the technology did not differentiate
among the types of files transmitted and could be used to share text documents, video files, or software applications.

The technology also provided a way for users to search for a particular file
within the network of users who were currently online - for example, by
name or by file type. A user could then initiate a direct connection between
his computer and the computer on which the desired file was stored that
would transfer a copy of that file to his computer. 34 Significantly, neither the
search nor the file rran fer involved use of the defendants' computer servers;
once the end user had downloaded the requisite software, the defendants'
participation was no longer required.

31 Jd. at 653.
32 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1032 (C.D.
Cal. 2003), a(f'd, 380 F.Jd 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). In itially,
the software distributed by the rhree defendants, although distributed under different
brands, consisted of the same technology (ca lled " FastTrack"), which the defendants obtained via license from its developer. StreamCast then moved to using nonproprietary peerto-peer technology (termed "Gnutella") under a sepa rate brand. After the case was filed,
Sharm an Networks took over the distribution from Kazaa BV, which defaulted in the case.

/d.
33 /d.
34 ld.
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MGM argued that the defendants were liable both for contributory copyright
infringement and for vicarious copyright infringement. After discovery developed the facts related above, both parties moved for summary judgment, thus
lea ving the only issue before the court one of law: whether the defendants'
conduct gave rise to liability for copyright infringement. The district court
found, with little discussion, that many users of the software were engaged in
direct copyright infringement by downloading works to which MGM held
the copyright. 35 It then concluded, however, that because "su bstantial noninfringing uses" 36 for the software existed (the current and future distribution
of, for example, noncopyrighted works or other works for which the copyright owner authorized distribution), constructive knowledge of end users'
infringement alone could not provide a basis for liability. Moreover, because
the defendants did not have actual knowledge of the end users' copyright
infringement at a time when they could take action based upon that knowledge (for example, by withholding further assistance to such infringers), Ji the
defendants could not be contributorily liabl e for their end users' infringement.38 Similarly, the district court found that, a lthough the defendants
derived a financial benefit from the users' infringing activities (in that an
increased user base increased the defendants' advertising revenue), the defe ndants did not maintain a system that allowed them to monitor and control
the network and so could not be held vicariously liable for end users' copyright infringement. 19 Accordingly, the district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgmen t, and, on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the N inth Circu it affirmed, concluding that the technology at issue "has
numerous other uses [besid es infringement], significantly reducing the distribution costs of public domain and permissively shared art and speech, as well
as reducing th e centralized control of that distribution." 40 The U.S. Supreme
Co urt agreed to review the Ninth Circuit's decision on December 10,2004. 41

IV. The Decision in the U.S. Supreme Court
Before the Court released its opinion in the case, the conventional wisdom
was that the case turned on whether the technology at issue was more like
U /d. at 10.14-35.
36 /d. at 1035 (citing So11y Corp. of Am. v. U11iversa l City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 41 7, 44 2
I 1984 )).
37 I d. at I037.
38 /d. a t I 043. Th e di st rict co urt noted that a lthou gh eac h of the defendants was engaged in
slightl y d ifferent activ iti es with res pect ro the distribution of networkin g software (e.g.,
th e use of certain users as "s upernodes" to route search traffic efficientl y), id. at 1039-41 ,
th ese differences were not material ro the findin g of conrributory liability.

39 /d . ar 1044-46. Beca use MGM sought onl y prospective in junctive reli ef, the district court
did nor consider wheth er pa st versions of the sohware might have given rise to liability.
/d. at 1033.
40 Metro-Goldwyn- Ma yer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 3!!0 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9 th Cir.
2004), t'acated, 125 S. Cr. 2764 (2005) .
41 125 S. Ct. 6!!6 (2004) (grant ing petition fur writ of certiorari).
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the video tape recorder- a technology ignorant of the uses to which it would
eventually be put- or more like Napster- a service run by a company that
had actual knowledge about the unlawful activities of its customers. Indeed,
it might have been the case that much of the decision would turn on whether
the Court viewed the defendants' technology as software over which the
defendants had little post-sale control (as did the Ninth Circuit) or as a
service that allowed continuing contact with customers. 42 Had this been the
analytical conceit, the decision that the defendants' offering constituted software wou ld, one might expect, have led the Court to an analysis of whether
that product was capable of "significant noninfringing uses" such that mere
constructive knowledge of un lawful activity would be insufficient to result in
liability.
The focus of the Court's opinion, however, was on a variant of contributorily
infringing activity noted in the Gershwin standard but ignored in the Ninth
Circuit's opinion: inducement of infringement. By focusing on the defendants' behavior rather than on the nature of the technology, this approach
found support from all nine members of the Court. In an opinion by Justice
Souter, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's opinion affirming the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded for recon ideration of MGM's own motion for summary judgment. Although prognosticators had expected Grokster to turn on an interpretation of Sony, the Court
put that question to one side, noting that Sony was of little value becau e the
Court was focusing here on the defendants' activity in inducing infringement, and there was "no evidence of stated or indicated intent to promote
infringing uses" on Sony's part. 43 In other words, given the difference in their
facts, Sony did not have to reach the issue of inducement, and Grokster did
not have to reach the issues of knowledge and material contribution.
The Court concluded, therefore, that the Ninth Circuit's analysis had gone
astray because the Ninth Circuit had interpreted Sony as having reached,
and eliminated, this additional basis of liability. In the Court's view, the
Ninth Circuit had inaccurately construed Sony to mean that "whenever a
product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held
contributorily liable for third parties' infringing use of it" even when "an
actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence independent of
design and distribution of the product." 44 This was not an entirely accurate

42 Although, as the Seventh Circuit noted in Aimster, denominating an offe rin g as a "service ..
is not dispositive of rhe liability question, Aimster, 334 F.Jd at 648, the defendant's degree
of control over future uses underlies the "material contribution" prong o f the standard.
43 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2777 (2005). This
conclusion is somewhat debatable given that, as Justice Blackmun noted in dissent, Sony's
promotional marerials did encourage users to u e their video tape recorders ro " record
favorite shows" or "build a library." Sony, 464 U.S. ar 459 (Biackmun, J., dissenting). The
Grokster Co urt concluded that " neith er of these uses was necessarily infringing." Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2777.
44 Grokster, 125 S. Cr. at 2778.
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description of the inth Circuit's opinion, which misguidedly ignored, rather
than eliminated, the inducement aspect of Gershwin's formulation. But by
resurrecting the inducement theory of secondary liability, and thus targeting
the defendants' particular activities apart from the mere distribution of
technology, the Court succe sfully avoided the conceptual conflation that
lurked at the heart of the case: the failure to distinguish between peer-to-pee r
technology generally (which almost certainly could not have been held to be
unlawful) and any entity's particular use or distribution of such technology
(the lawfulness of which would be an inherently fact-bound determination).
Because the Ninth Circuit had not focused on other theories of secondary
liability apart from the distribution of a particular product design with
knowledge of its possible infringing uses, the Supreme Court was free to
leave any further consideration of the Sony standard- such as how substantial noninfringing uses must be before they qualify- for another day.
Accordingly, although the notion of inducement as a basis for contributory
copyright infringement a lready existed in the common law, the Court set
forth the principle specifically: "(0 Jne who distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties." 45 With the question posed as
"Did these defendants induce copyright infringement by end users in ways
other than simply distributing the technology?" the question became easy for
the Court to answer. Indeed, "the classic case" of contributory infringement,
the Court noted, occurs when one induces, entices, or persuades another to
commit infringement (for example, in advertising or instruction manuals). 46
In this case, the Court concluded, there was considerable evidence of intent
to induce copyright infringement. The Court was wi ll ing to accept from the
evidence in the record that "the vast majority of users' downloads are acts of
infringement" and that "the probable scope of copyright infringement is
staggering." 4 7 The key fact was that, in the Court's view, the defendants
were not "merely pa ive recipients of information [from the plaintiffs]
about [such] infringing use. " 48 Rather, the Court noted, there was abundant
evidence that both defendants, from the first moment of distribution,
"clearly voiced the objective that recipients use it to download copyrighted
works, and each took active steps to encourage infringement." 49 Such evidence, in the Court's view, was of three types. First, the defendants attempted
to capture the user market left when Napster ceased operations, such as by
creating Napster-compatible software to harvest e-mail addresses of likely
users of peer-to-peer networking software; using metatags reading "Napster"
and "free filesharing'' in their websites to attract users inputting those terms

45 ld. a t 2780.
46 /d . ar 2779.
47 /d . a t 2772.
48 /d.
49 /d.
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into search engines; creating promotional materials that referenced particular copyrighted material (such as "Top 40 music") that would be available
via the network; and - in Grokster's case - choosing a name that was "an
apparent derivative of Napster." 50 Second, the defendants' business models,
which depended on advertising revenue for viability, anticipated an increasing user base, which in turn depended on " free access to copyrighted
work. " 5 1 And, finally, the defendants took no action to filter or otherwise
restrict access to copyrighted works via the network. 52
What this meant for the defendants at the time was clear from the Court's
opinion. (As a procedural matter, the case was remanded either for trial or
for a consideration of MGM 's motion for summary judgment; Grokster
settled in November 2005, but Streamcast is, as of this writing, still a party
to the litigation.) What this means for developers of technology in the future
is less clear. The Court offered some exa mples of acts on the outer boundaries of its declared standard: "mere knowledge of infringing potentia l or of
actual infringing uses" is insufficient, as are, standing a lon e, "ordinary acts
incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technica l support
or product updates." 53 To the contrary, the Court reassured, only "purposeful, culpable expression and conduct" 54 would suffice, leaving further elaboration of this test to future cases and future courts. Thus, it i uncertain, for
example, to what extent a competitor marketing in the same genera l field of
commerce as an infringer can attempt to attract that infringer's customers
without being seen as inducing those customers to infringe. (It might be
possible, for example, that a competitor seeks to draw such customers by
offering them a legitimate product.) Similarly, the Court's focus on the
defendants' failure to develop means to filter or otherwise restrict infringing
activity on the network seems to embed the Court in questions of product
design that not only are unwise from an in titutional competence standpoint
but also seem to run afoul of the standard stated in Son y and reaffirmed in
Grokster: that design alone is not a basis of liability unl ess there ca n be no
other purpose for the design but infringement. Indeed, in a footnote that is
likely to be the focus of future litigation, the Court noted :
Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable
to find contributory infringement liability merely based on a fai lure to ta ke
affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise wa capable
of substantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would tread too close to the
Sony safe har bor.5 5
50 /d. at 2773-74; see also id. at 278 1 ("Grokster and StreamCast's efforts to supply services
ro fo rmer N a pster users, deprived o f a mechanism to copy and distribute what were overwhelmingly infringing files, indicate a principa l, if nor exclusive, intent on rhe parr of
each to bring about infringement. ").
51 Id. ar 2774.

52
53
54
55

/d.
Id. ar 2780.
/d.
/d. at 2781 n. 12.
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And finally it seems overly broad to suggest that a service that depends
wholly on advertising revenue for its support can thereby be seen as encouraging infringement rather than simply hoping for an expanded user
base. To say that de ire for an expanded user base is proof that infringing
activity is intended is to put the cart before the horse.
Of course, the Court was not considering any of these activities on their
own, and this is what makes it diffic ult to gain guidance from the opinion as
to what other collections of activities risk liability for copyright infringement. Indeed, one might argue that Sony met each of these elements with
regard to the video tape recorder: the advertising materials encouraged users
to "build a library" (although the Sony Court was able to minimize this fact
by noting that not all uses of the video tape recorder were infringing56 ); there
was no evidence that Sony had taken any action to limit the infringing
potential of the video tape recorder (by, for example, enabling the product
only to play and not to record); and there was no suggestion that Sony did
not desire a broad user base for its product that depended, at least in part, on
the ability to record copyrighted content. In addition, none of the three types
of evidence identified by the Court necessarily requires any communication
whatsoever with end users, suggesting that mere intent to induce could be
sufficient. Finally, it seems that the Court was infl uenced to some degree by
the size of the problem in this case and not merely by satisfaction of an
existing standard. Alth ough the Court acknowledged the need to balance
copyright protection with the development of technology, it also acknowledged a strong pull toward liability in this case given the scope of infringement and the difficulties in effective enforcement given the size of the user
base Y Thus, a collection of bad facts may wel l have resulted in rather
opaque law.
Two concurrences, one authored by Justice Ginsburg and one by Justice
Breyer, offered opposite views on the question the majority opinion did not
address: how the Sony issue should be resolved. Justice Ginsburg (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy) concluded, based on the record,
that the use of the defendants' software for infringement was "overwhelming"58 and that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate, "beyond
genuine debate, a reasonable prospect that substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses were likely to develop over time"- an echo of the
Seventh Circuit's analysis in Aimster. 59 Justice Breyer, by contrast (joined by
Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor), noted that the evidence before the
lower court indicated that approximately 10 percent of files traded on Grokster's network were noninfringing, a figure that qualified as "substantial
56 See, e.g., id. at 2784 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (descr ibing the Sony Court's conclusion
that "private noncommercial rime-sh ifting of te levision programs in the home" was either
authorized o r legi tim ate fair use) .
57 /d. at 2776.
58 /d. at 2786 (G ins burg, J., co ncurring).
59 /d. (Ginsburg, j ., concurring).
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noninfringing use" in Sony. 60 Justice Breyer also noted the Sony standard's
emphasis on whether the product is "capable of" substantial noninfringing
uses and suggested that while a 10 percent figure would not qualify as
substantial if maintained over a period of years, it might serve as a baseline
from which reasonably anticipated noninfringing uses could develop. 61
Of the two, Justice Breyer's concurrence is more faithful to the values underlying Sony. By phrasing the Sony question as whether the defendants' software products were capable of substantial noninfringing uses, Justice Ginsburg merged the product with the particular use of the product. The point of
Sony, however, is that the two are separate. Distribution of peer-to-peer
technology generally cannot form the basis of secondary liability, just as the
distribution of e-mail technology, instant messaging technology, the photocopier, and the video tape recorder cannot, even though all are technologies
that permit end users to commit some- and perhaps a significant amount of
-copyright infringement. Justice Breyer recognized this when he noted that
the record showed ''a ignificant future market for non infringing uses of
Grokster-type peer-to-peer software. " 62 Indeed, he noted, quire rightl y, that
the standard in Sony "seeks to protect not the Groksters of this world ... but
the development of technology more generally. And Grokster's desires in this
respect are beside the point." 63 Maintaining this distinction is crucial to
enabling the Sony standard to strike the right balance between copyright
protection and techno logy development, providing clear guidance to developers, reducing uncertainty, and looking toward the future, rather than
relying on a "static snapshot of a product's current uses." 64
Justice Ginsburg, by contrast, muddied the conceptual waters when she
faulted the lower courts for not "sharply distinguish[ing] between uses of
Grokster's and SrreamCast's software products (which this case is about)
and uses of peer-to-peer technology generally (which this case is nor
about) ." 65 Whi le this is true insofar as the failure to mak e thi s distinction led
the lower courts to ignore an inducement-based theory of contributory copyright infringement, it is not clear how this statement ca n be reconciled with
Justice Ginsburg's earlier statement that there was insufficient evi dence to
demonstrate that commercially significant noninfringing uses would develop
over time, a conclusion that is erroneous given the record with respect to
peer-to-peer technology generally. If, in her view, "Grok ter's and StreamCast's software products" are something different from " peer-to-peer tech60 /d. at 2788-89 (Breyer, J., concurring).
6 1 /d. ar 2789 (Breye r, J., concurring) (li sting develo pmenr of many noninfringing uses, such
as exchange of resea rch in for mation, ph otos, and "sha reware").
62 /d. (Breye r, J. , concmring) (em ph asis added) . Simila rly, Justice Breyer referred to the focus
of the case as " [s]ervices like Grok ster. " /d. at 2794 (Breyer, j., concurring) (e mpha sis
added) .
63 Jd. at 2790 (Breye r,]., concurri ng) .
64 /d. ar 2791-92 (Breyer, J., concurri ng) .
65 /d. at 2786 (G insburg, .J., concurring).
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nology generally, " and if there is not any significant technological difference
between the technology the defendants offered and other types of peer-topeer technology, then what are "Grokster' and StreamCast's software prod ucts"? Justice Ginsburg's exhortation suggests two possibilities: "Grokster's
and StreamCast's software products" are defined as peer-to-peer technology
at a particular point in time (such that the product is unlawful now given the
kinds of use but may not be later if the percentage of lawful uses grows), or
peer-to-peer tech nology promoted in a particular way. Because the latter was
the basis for the Court's inducement theory, Justice Ginsburg seems to
suggest that - for purpo es of the Sony standard - "Grokster's and StreamCast's software products" are the former. But if whether the technology is
lawful or unlawful is based on the kinds and numbers of uses as of the time
of the litigation (and not on future use), then Sony's focus on potential uses
has vanished, leaving in its place a requirement that early innovators are
subject ro liability, while later distributors of the same technology (assuming
any exist) can benefit from the variety of uses that have appeared over time.
This is not what the Court in Sony intended.

V Conclusion
What guidance can technology developers take from the Grokster decision?
The answer is not at a ll clear. While the decision might suggest that avoiding
future enforcement efforts is as simple as limiting the claims made in one's
marketing materials or by one's customer service representatives and refraining from activiti es designed to expand one's user base, this is unlikely to
prove to be useful advice. As a matter of pure corporate governance, there
will almost certain ly be times when the exuberance of marketing teams or
other customer contacts will outpace the restraint urged by legal counsel;
even when developers are cautious, the opinion offers little in the way of
particulars as to what other types of activity might constitute inducement.
Relatedly, an instruction to eliminate any statements from marketing materials and instruction manuals that might be construed as encouraging users to
make copies of protected content might thwart legitimate and truthful descriptions of technology that would seem to meet the Sony standard, such as
photocopiers and digital cameras.
In additi on, the dueling concurrences, each of which garnered three votes,
leaves the question of the future application of the Sony standard entirely
open. 66 While the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Ninth Circuit, it
did not offer a direct rebuke to the circuit court's reading of the knowledge
requirement of the Sony standard, instead noting that the Ninth Circuit focused
on Sony ro the exclusion of the traditional inducement theory of contrib utory
infringement. Thus, the question of how much of a technology's use must be
noninfringing to qualify, and at what point in time, remains unanswered.
66 This is particularl y uue in light of the subsequent death of Justi ce Rehnquist (who joined
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence) and retirement of Ju stice O'Connor (who joined Justice
Breyer's concurrence) .
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As Grokster begins to be applied in the lower courts, what will emerge will
be a series of highly fact-dependent rulings that - one hopes - will outline
the contours of what activity constitutes inducement. In the only copyright
infringement opinion to have been issued by a federal district court since
Grokster, as of this writing, the court found, after a full bench trial, that no
indicia of inducement on the part of the defendant were present. 6 7 A for the
parties to Grokster, while the case was a loss for the defendants, it was
equa ll y a loss for the copyright owners, who are now faced with a series of
fact-specific actions against an endless stream of software developers. The
real question- how Sony should be adapted for the digital age- will ha ve to
wait for another year.

67 Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bit;tream Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 8 77 ( .D. 111. 2005 ) (no liability
where defendant did not target audience seeking copyrighted material; took steps to avoid
infringement; and did nor have business model predicated on infringement). In MEMC
Electronic Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicott Corp., 420 F.3d 1369 (2005), the
U.S. Courr of Appeals for the Federal Circuit cited Grokster as authority in determining
whether inducemenr of parent infringement had occurred. ld. at 1379·80.
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